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Bart Hobijn
With the recent run-up in crop and energy prices—and the subsequent sharp reversal of these trends—
the effects of commodity price movements on U.S. inflation merit renewed attention. A study of
the contributions of grain and oil prices to the PCE index of inflation suggests that the effects are
more modest than one might expect. Moreover, commodity price increases affect relatively few goods
prices: Higher crop prices translate narrowly into price hikes for food, tobacco, and gardening
supplies; rising oil prices mainly influence fuel, energy, and transportation prices.
F
rom June 2006 through June 2008, crude
petroleum prices increased at an average
annual rate of 40 percent, while grain prices
grew still faster, at a 62 percent rate. Subsequent months,
however, saw a reversal of these trends, with both oil and
grain prices falling by 20 percent (60 percent annualized).1
To what extent do such swings in the price of these
commodities affect the price of the “final” goods bought
by U.S. consumers? And how great an impact do the com-
modity price movements have on an overall measure of
U.S. inflation such as the PCE (personal consumption
expenditures) index?2
In this edition of Current Issues, we address these ques-
tions in two steps. First, we use data on inter-industry 
purchases and sales to assess the importance of grains—
or more broadly, crops—and oil and natural gas in the
production of a variety of personal consumption goods
and services. Specifically, we compute the share of the cost
of the final goods and services that is attributable to the
output of the oil and farm industries. Second, we calculate
the contribution that changes in the price of oil and grains
make to PCE inflation, assuming that these changes are
fully passed through along every stage in the production
process. Although in this second step we focus on the
impact of the June 2006-June 2008 commodity price
increases on inflation, the effect of the declines in oil and
grain prices that started in mid-2008 could be calculated
in the same way and should be proportional.
Our findings indicate that crops accounted for about 
1.0 percent of the cost of total personal consumption
expenditures in 2006, while oil and gas made up 2.8 per-
cent. If we consider only corePCE—personal consumption
expenditures excluding food and fuel—then the cost share
of crops falls to 0.3 percent and the share of oil and gas
declines to 1.4 percent.
As for aggregate price growth, our results suggest that
of the 3.2 percent annualized PCE inflation during the June
2006-June 2008 period, 0.4 percentage point can be attrib-
uted to crop price increases and 1.1 percentage points to
increases in oil and gas prices, for a total of 1.5 percentage
points. For core inflation, which was 2.2 percent (annual-
ized), these figures are 0.1 and 0.6, respectively, for a total
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1 All commodity price data refer to U.S. producer prices and are through
June 2008.
2 We focus on the PCE index because it covers a broader set of goods and 
services than the more widely followed consumer price index.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 14, NUMBER 8
of 0.7 percentage point. Thus, slightly less than half of the
growth of the overall PCE in this period, and slightly less
than a third of the growth in the core index, may be attrib-
uted to growth in the price of energy and crops.
The contributions of commodities to the rise in the core
PCE index are more modest than one might expect—partic-
ularly in light of the common perception that rising fuel
prices drive inflation in other goods and services. Moreover,
our results suggest that commodity price increases affect a
limited range of goods prices: Higher crop prices translate
narrowly into price hikes for food, tobacco, and gardening
supplies, while the influence of rising oil prices is confined
largely to fuel, energy, and transportation prices. Hence, if
persistent price increases are seen in core consumer goods
and services, we can conclude that significant alternative
inflationary pressures are at work.
Commodity Price Increases
Between June 2006 and June 2008—the sample period
examined in this study—prices of a broad range of com-
modities increased to record-high levels. Most notably, grain
prices more than doubled and oil prices almost doubled. 
Charts 1 and 2 put these trends in historical perspective.
Chart 1 shows the prices of grains and crops over a ten-year
period. In a pronounced break with their earlier behavior,
grain prices rose 163 percent between June 2006 and June
2008. This increase also led to a rise in the price of the
broader category of crops, which rose by 95 percent over the
sample period. (Box 1 lists the commodities classified as
components of crops.)
Chart 2 shows the prices of crude petroleum (oil) and
natural gas, also over a ten-year period. Oil in June 2008 was
more than five times as expensive as it was ten years before.
After spiking in the second half of 2005, natural gas prices
declined substantially through September 2007.3 However,
between September 2007 and June 2008, prices more than
doubled. As a result, natural gas prices were 97 percent
higher in June 2008 than they were two years earlier.
Like oil and crops, commodities such as metals experi-
enced substantial price growth in the June 2006-June 2008
period. Indeed, not only were the increases for these individ-
ual commodities unprecedented by historical standards,
they all occurred at the same time. 
There are several possible explanations for the rising
commodity prices.4One is the depreciation of the U.S. dollar.
Most commodity prices are quoted in dollars. The trade-
weighted dollar exchange rate decreased by 11 percent from
June 2006 to June 2008.5 This decline would encourage for-
eign buyers, whose currencies were worth more in terms of
dollars, to pay more U.S. dollars for commodities. A dollar
depreciation in principle could therefore help to boost com-
modity prices. However, the increases in commodity prices
through June 2008 were very much larger than the decline in
the U.S. dollar exchange rate. 
A second explanation is a marked increase in global demand
for commodities, driven largely by emerging economies such 
as China and India. This trend poses a major concern for oil in
particular. Johnson, Crawford, and Bunger (2004) describe how
world oil consumption since 1990 has outpaced oil discoveries.
Such a rise in demand relative to supply would lead to persistent
price escalation. 
Third, temporary decreases in supply, which are very spe-
cific to certain commodities, could account for the upturn 
in prices. For example, disruptions to the wheat crop in
Australia and a number of other regions reduced the 2007
harvest and triggered higher prices. However, this particular
reduction in supply is most likely temporary and will proba-
bly be offset by increased production in response to current
prices. In fact, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (2008) forecasts a record output level for
cereals for 2008, a 3.8 percent increase from 2007.
2
3 The 2005 spike is attributable mainly to the natural gas supply disruptions
caused by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. According to Energy and Environmental
Analysis, Inc. (2005), 40 percent of U.S. natural gas production occurs in the Gulf
Coast region. Katrina and Rita resulted in a temporary 50 percent decline in off-
shore natural gas production there. Natural gas prices consequently soared in fall
2005 and slowly returned to lower levels when supply stabilized.
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; author’s calculations.
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4 Krugman (2008) offers a useful discussion of these explanations. One that is
not considered here is a direct link between commodity price movements and
longer term inflation expectations.
5 See the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database FRED (Federal Reserve
Economic Data), series DTWEXB,at <http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/>.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 3
Finally, increased speculation in the commodities futures
markets may have helped to elevate prices. Masters (2008)
discusses the growing importance of “index speculators” in
these markets, and explains how the growth of their exposure
coincided with the 2006-08 run-up in commodity prices. 
Regardless of the source, the escalation in commodity
prices between June 2006 and June 2008 could clearly affect
inflation. We therefore determine the degree to which such
price increases accounted for inflationary pressures. As a first
step, we assess the importance of commodity prices for the
price of final goods, or personal consumption expenditures.
Commodity Input Shares of Personal Consumption
Consumers do not pay commodity prices directly because they
do not buy commodities, such as crude petroleum or wheat,
directly. Instead, they buy goods that are produced using com-
modities as inputs. To what degree commodity price increases
lead to consumption price increases depends significantly on
the importance of the commodities for the production of
goods. Moreover, when one considers the importance of par-
ticular inputs for the production of final goods, it is essential to
take into account the entire supply chain.
Consider gasoline and oil. For each dollar spent on gaso-
line in 2006, 40 cents paid for the output produced by oil
refineries,6 3 cents was attributable to the transportation of
gasoline to the gas station, 34 cents was revenue for gasoline
wholesalers, and the remaining 23 cents went to the owner of
the gas station in the form of profits and to pay for expenses
such as operation of the station.
These figures might suggest that crude petroleum made
up 40 percent of the price of gasoline in 2006. However, only
51 percent of refinery revenue that year reflected the cost of
crude petroleum inputs; the remainder covered the refiner-
ies’ labor and equipment costs. The input share of crude oil
in gasoline was therefore only about 21 percent.
In addition to the oil inputs from the refineries that 
supply the gasoline, oil is used to produce the fuel needed to
transport the gasoline as well as to produce other inputs
used by the refineries and the wholesale, retail, and trans-
portation sectors that contribute to the supply of gasoline.
The oil needed for these other inputs makes up about 
4.6 percent of the cost of gasoline. Therefore, the total input
share of oil in gasoline for all stages of the supply chain is
25.6 percent.
To calculate the input share of commodities in the produc-
tion of all categories of consumption goods, we rely on data
on inter-industry purchases and sales in the United States.
Specifically, we turn to the widely used 2006 input-output
tables compiled by Chentrens (2007) for the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS).7 (Box 2 describes the calculations underly-
ing the commodity input shares.) We consider the inputs in
the BLS input-output tables that best match the commodities
experiencing large price increases over the June 2006-
June 2008 period. Grains are part of crop inputs in the inter-
industry accounts; crude petroleum is part of oil and gas.8
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Chart 2
Energy Prices, January 1998-June 2008
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6 Oil refineries are part of the industry category petroleum and coal products 
manufacturing.   
7 These tables are used by the BLS for its employment outlook projections. They
also underlie the U.S. KLEMS data set that is often used for industry-level pro-
ductivity studies (see Jorgenson and Stiroh [2000]).
8 The fact that the input-output accounts do not treat oil and gas as separate
inputs is relevant for the interpretation of some results below.
There is no direct match between commodities in the input-
output tables used to calculate input shares and commodities
in the producer price index (PPI) used to calculate prices.
The table below shows the match between commodities that
we use to calculate our results.
Input-Output Commodities PPI Commodities
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The total input shares of the commodities for different cate-
gories of personal consumption expenditures are listed in
columns 1 and 2 of the table below.
To understand this methodology fully, consider the 
1.00 percent input share of crops in total PCE expenditures:
For every dollar of personal consumption expenditures in
the United States in 2006, about one cent can be traced back
to the cost of crops used at all stages of production along the
supply chain. This amount includes the costs of domesti-
cally produced and imported crops.
Not surprisingly, crops are most important for the pro-
duction of food: 5.3 percent of the price of food bought by
U.S. consumers in 2006 can be attributed to the crops used in
production. Crops are also an input in the production of
“other non-durables,” a category that includes tobacco prod-
ucts and flowers, pots, and plants. Overall, however, crops are
used almost solely for food and do not account for any sub-
stantial fraction of expenditures in other PCE categories.
Indeed, the crops input share for core PCE—consumer
expenditures on goods and services other than food and
energy—is less than a third of its input share for total PCE:
0.3 percent compared with 1.0 percent.
Also not surprisingly, oil and gas inputs figure impor-
tantly in only three PCE categories: gasoline, fuel oil, and
other energy goods; utilities in household operations; and
transportation. The BLS input-output tables do not treat
crude petroleum and natural gas as separate inputs. How-
ever, it is likely that crude petroleum is more important for
gasoline, fuel oil, and other energy goods and that natural
gas is more important for utilities. In any case, oil and gas
inputs together do not account for more than 1.5 percent of
any of the remaining PCE categories except food. In the
aggregate, this results in a 1.4 percent input share for core
PCE and a 2.8 percent share for total PCE—suggesting that
energy is only about half as important for core inflation as it
is for total inflation.
4
From the input-output accounts, we can obtain a commodity-
commodity use table that measures the fraction of a dollar 
of (gross) output of a commodity attributed to the use of the
n different commodities as intermediate inputs. We denote
this matrix by A,where the (i,j)th element is the fraction of
intermediate input shares of commodity i in the output of
commodity j. 
Crop prices and oil and gas prices are gross output prices 
for these commodities; therefore, we do not want to account
for the inputs used in their production. The commodity
prices already reflect that fact. Thus, we set the columns of A
associated with crops and with oil and gas equal to zero.
We can also obtain the composition of a dollar of personal
consumption expenditures (of different types). We let the 
column vector b contain this composition, such that the i th
element of b is the share of commodity i in personal con-
sumption expenditures. We define r as an (n1)-vector, the 
i-th element of which is the input share of commodity i in
personal consumption expenditures. Then we can calculate
r=(In A)1b,
where In is an (nn)-identity matrix.
The commodity input shares of crops and oil and gas for
the production of personal consumption expenditures are the
two elements of r associated with crops and with oil and gas,
respectively. This method of accounting for commodity input
shares means that the estimates presented in the text do not
include the input share of oil and gas in the production of
crops and vice versa. 
a This discussion does not address the treatment of imports. For the
results presented in the text, we treat imports of different commodities 
as different inputs. We assume that imports of commodities flow through
the U.S. economy in much the same way that domestically produced
commodities do.
Box 2
Calculation of Commodity Input Sharesa
Contribution of Commodity Prices to Inflation 
for Different Personal Consumption Expenditure 
(PCE) Categories
Percent, Except As Noted
Percentage Point
Contribution to
Input Share PCE Inflation
Crops Oil and Gas Crops Oil and Gas




Total expenditures 1.00 2.85 0.39 1.14 3.2
Less food and energy 0.31 1.38 0.12 0.56 2.2
Durables 0.11 1.23 0.04 0.49 -1.5
Motor vehicles 0.08 1.19 0.03 0.48 -0.4
Furniture and
household equipment 0.13 1.23 0.05 0.49 -4.5
Other durables 0.11 1.28 0.04 0.51 2.1
Non-durables 3.46 5.89 1.37 2.36 4.7
Food 5.27 2.05 2.08 0.82 4.4
Clothing and shoes 0.16 1.02 0.06 0.41 -1.2
Gasoline, fuel oil, and
other energy goods 0.11 25.60 0.04 10.28 18.6
Other non-durables 1.94 1.59 0.77 0.64 1.4
Services 0.13 2.19 0.05 0.88 3.4
Housing 0.11 0.87 0.04 0.35 3.2
Household operations 0.10 10.69 0.04 4.29 5.0
Transportation 0.07 2.72 0.03 1.09 3.9
Medical care 0.14 1.44 0.06 0.58 3.0
Recreation 0.28 1.40 0.11 0.56 2.2
Other services 0.10 1.30 0.04 0.52 3.6
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department of Commerce,





Having established the input shares of crops and of oil
and gas for different PCE categories, we now consider the
amount of PCE inflation attributable to the price increases in
these commodities.
Implications for PCE Inflation
How much would the prices of different PCE categories have
risen if the commodity price increases between June 2006
and June 2008 had been fully passed through to consumers
via the supply chain? The answer represents the commodity
price contribution to PCE inflation. This contribution can be
calculated as the input share of a commodity times the per-
centage increase in the commodity price.9
The increase in the price of crops from June 2006 through
June 2008 was 39.5 percent (annualized). When we combine
crude petroleum and natural gas prices in one price index,
we calculate that oil and gas prices increased 40.1 percent
(annualized) over the period.10
Columns 3 and 4 of our table present the percentage point
contributions of crops and oil and gas to PCE inflation from
June 2006 to June 2008. For comparison, we report the actual
inflation rate for these PCE categories in column 5. As the
table shows, crop price increases account for about half of
recent food price increases. Moreover, these increases also
account for about half of the price increases in the “other
non-durables” category, which includes tobacco and garden-
ing supplies.
While it is informative to consider the PCE categories that
are most affected by crop prices, more insight can be gained
from examining the categories that are only minimally
affected. Because crops have a low input share for all PCE
categories except food and non-durables, crop price
increases do not seem to have a pronounced effect on PCE
inflation beyond these two categories.
As a result, crop price increases over our sample period
account for only 0.12 percentage point of the observed 
2.2 percent annualized rate of core PCE inflation. When 
one includes food (and energy), the increases account for
0.39 percentage point of the 3.2 percent annualized rate of
total PCE inflation.
Rising oil and gas prices have a more widespread effect on
PCE inflation than do rising crop prices, but even in the case
of energy prices, the large inflation contributions are con-
centrated in just three PCE categories. Energy price increases
account for 10.3 percentage points of the 18.6 percent annu-
alized increase in the price of gasoline and related goods
from June 2006 to June 2008. They also account for the vast
majority (4.3 percentage points out of a total of 5.0 percent-
age points) of price increases in household operations and a
third of the growth in transportation prices.
Beyond these three oil-intensive categories, the 40.1 per-
cent rate of growth of oil and gas prices over the sample
period translates into only about a 0.5 percentage point con-
tribution to PCE inflation for most other categories. Overall,
oil and gas price increases contributed 1.1 percentage points
to the 3.2 percent rate of total PCE inflation during the
period and half as much to the 2.2 percent rate of core PCE
inflation.
While our focus is on the contributions of commodity
prices to PCE inflation over the past two years, we note that
the behavior of energy prices has differed from that of food
prices over the longer term. Oil and gas prices were already
increasing at a much higher rate than PCE inflation over
almost all of the last decade; from June 1998 through June
2006, crude petroleum prices rose at a 24 percent annualized
rate and natural gas prices climbed at a 14 percent rate.
Hence, energy costs were already contributing a substantial
amount to PCE inflation before June 2006.
Crop prices, however, followed a different course over the
past decade. In the eight years preceding June 2006, they
increased at a modest 2.4 percent annualized rate. Their
inflation rate thus accelerated by more than 37 percentage
points from June 2006 to June 2008. 
Combining the effects of crop prices and oil and gas
prices, we find that food- and energy-related commodity
prices explain 1.5 percentage points of total PCE inflation
and 0.7 percentage point of core PCE inflation in the ten-year
period examined. In other words, the combined growth in
crop and energy prices accounted for a little less than half of
the growth of overall PCE inflation in the June 2006-June
2008 period and a little less than a third of the growth in the
core index. The difference between these two amounts is
approximately equal to the actual difference between total
and core PCE inflation since June 2006.
Taking these results at face value, we can derive some
simple rules-of–thumb for estimating the inflation effects of
a rise in crop and energy prices. First, 10 percent annualized
inflation in crop prices accounts for about 0.10 percentage
point annualized inflation for total PCE and 0.03 for core
PCE. Second, 10 percent annualized inflation in oil prices
accounts for 0.29 percentage point of annualized inflation
9 Technically speaking, this calculation yields the inflation contribution of the
commodity in a fixed-weighted Laspeyres price index, with weights based 
on 2006 inter-industry purchases and sales. The commodity input shares
reported in our table are calculated for 2006 input prices. Using these shares as
the basis of our analysis implies that the calculations might pick up inflation-
ary pressures that are mitigated by producers substituting away from relatively
expensive inputs. In this sense, our analysis is subject to what economists call
standard substitution bias, which leads to an overestimation of the contribu-
tion of commodity price increases to PCE inflation. See Diewert (2001) for an
extensive review of the related price index and index number theory. 
10This index is based on the 2008 relative weights of crude petroleum and natu-
ral gas in the producer price index.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 14, NUMBER 8
for total PCE and 0.14 for core PCE. These same rules-of-
thumb should apply to the calculation of the inflation effects
of a decline in crop and energy prices; for example, a 10 per-
cent annualized drop in energy prices should account for a
0.29 percentage point decline in total PCE inflation.
Our results also suggest that commodity prices—and
particularly energy prices—are not the controlling force in
core inflation dynamics that they are sometimes assumed to
be.  As we have seen,  growth in crop and energy prices
accounted for a little less than half of overall PCE inflation in
the June 2006-June 2008 period. Moreover, the contributions
of these commodity prices to inflation were largely confined
to a narrow range of goods and services. Accordingly, very
substantial increases observed in PCE inflation beyond food,
energy, utilities, and transportation are unlikely to be attrib-
utable to grain, soy, oil, or natural gas price increases.
Other Considerations
Our results provide evidence of the direct effect of commod-
ity price increases passing through to consumer prices. 
Yet some important issues that could lead to an over- or
underestimation of the effect merit attention.
One is the assumption we make about the timing of the
pass-through used for our calculations. Specifically, our
study assumes that the commodity price increases between
June 2006 and June 2008 were fully passed through to PCE
prices.  Evidence suggests,  however ,  that delays in pass-
through from commodity prices to consumer prices differ
substantially across goods categories.
The effect of oil prices on consumer prices, especially on
the price of gasoline, has been studied extensively. As Brown
and Yücel (2000) show, the bulk of oil price increases is
reflected in gasoline prices within four weeks. However, oil
price declines take several months before they are reflected 
in consumer prices. Crop price increases affect consumer
prices over approximately a year, as the increases attributable
to higher crop input prices pass slowly through the U.S. 
supply chain.
Evidence on delays is also important for assessing the
effect of a moderation of commodity prices on PCE inflation.
Suppose that crop and oil prices had stabilized at roughly
mid-2008 levels. Barring any changes in other inflationary
pressures, the results above suggest such a stabilization would
reduce total PCE inflation by about 0.7 percent and core PCE
inflation by 0.5 percent in 2009 relative to 2007 and 2008.
A second issue concerns the channels through which
commodity price increases could indirectly trigger more
widespread inflation—for example, by increasing noncom-
modity factor costs, by affecting profit margins, and by rais-
ing import prices.
Factor costs mainly consist of labor compensation costs
and capital costs. Since an increase in commodity prices
leads to higher consumer prices, it may well work to boost
the growth of wages (and, ultimately, labor costs) as workers
attempt to maintain their real incomes in the face of a rising
cost of living. However, because wage growth has been quite
stable over the last few years, this channel has evidently not
been operative—although, given the increase in unemploy-
ment in 2008, wage growth could conceivably have fallen had
commodity price gains not put upward pressure on prices. In
terms of capital costs, it is hard to trace any clear conceptual
relationship between commodity prices and financing costs
or the acquisition costs of capital goods—except for the
influence that commodity prices have on the cost of produc-
ing capital goods, which is probably quite small.
Profit margins, the second channel, are not likely to rise in
response to commodity price increases. The increases in the
June 2006-June 2008 period coincided with a slowdown in
U.S. economic activity, which has a damping effect on profits.
As for the third channel, import prices, a surge in com-
modity prices not only leads to price increases in the United
States, it is also likely to boost prices of goods produced
abroad. Imports of oil and gas, crops, coal, and metal are
already included in the commodity input shares reported in
the table. We therefore implicitly assume that U.S. producer
price increases for commodities closely follow increases in
international commodity markets. If commodity prices raise
domestic production costs of consumer goods in the United
States, they most likely also put upward pressure on the costs
of imported goods. Unfortunately, we cannot account for the
importance of commodity inputs to the cost of imports in
the same way that we can for goods produced in the United
States. Such a calculation would require detailed interna-
tional input-output information that is not available.
We can, however, consider the import share for different
PCE categories. Applying a method similar to the one used to
determine commodity input shares, we calculate that 9.2 per-
cent of the cost of total PCE in 2006 could be traced back 
to imported final goods as well as to the imported intermedi-
ates used to produce them.11 Imports contribute mainly to
goods PCE rather than to services PCE. If the price of these
imports increased at the same rate as PCE prices did in
response to surging commodity prices, these commodity
effects would have added an effect of about 0.04 percentage
point for crop prices and 0.11 percentage point for oil and gas
prices to total PCE inflation over the June 2006-June 2008
period.12 These figures suggest that the effect of commodity
6
11The figure does not include crop and oil and gas imports.
12 McCarthy (1999) documents that changes in import prices take about two
years to affect consumer prices fully.price increases on PCE inflation through import prices is
rather limited.
However, because much energy-intensive manufacturing
activity has shifted abroad, it is not unreasonable to assume
that U.S. imports are more energy-intensive than domesti-
cally produced goods and services. In that case, the effect of
commodity prices on U.S. inflation through higher import
prices might be more substantial than our informal calcula-
tion suggests.
Indeed, in terms of an effect on import prices, the ex-
change rate is more influential than commodity prices.
Because most commodities are traded on international
markets in U.S.-dollar–denominated prices, changes in the
dollar exchange rate affect commodity prices. Thus, com-
modity price increases should not be considered indepen-
dently of exchange rate movements. However, disentangling
these factors would require analytical tools that are beyond
the scope of our study.
Conclusion
This article evaluates the importance of commodity price
increases for PCE inflation over the June 2006-June 2008
period. Our analysis of the role of commodities in the pro-
duction process of personal consumption goods and services
shows that crops accounted for about 1.0 percent of the cost
of inputs needed to produce a dollar of total PCE in 2006; oil
and gas accounted for 2.8 percent. Crops represented 0.3 per-
cent of core PCE and oil and gas 1.4 percent. 
When we combine our calculations with price data, we
find that of the 3.2 percent annualized total PCE inflation
from June 2006 to June 2008, 0.4 percentage point can be
attributed to crop price increases and 1.1 to rising oil and
gas prices. For core PCE inflation, which was 2.2 percent
(annualized), the figures are 0.1 and 0.6 percentage point,
respectively.
These results reveal that the combined effect of food- and
energy-related commodity price increases accounts for
almost the entire inflation differential between total PCE and
core PCE observed over the period examined. Moreover,  our
results indicate that the effects of crop and oil price increases
are concentrated in a narrow range of goods prices. Crop
price increases mainly affect food inflation; they affect
tobacco and gardening supplies slightly. Rising oil prices add
primarily to fuel, utility, and transportation prices.
We conclude that increases in PCE inflation beyond food,
energy, utilities, and transportation are unlikely to stem from
increases in grain, soy, oil, or natural gas prices. If higher
prices are observed in core consumer goods and services,
other inflationary pressures are undoubtedly at work.
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